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ON RESPONSIBILITY: OR, THE INSANITY OF MENTAL
DEFENSES AND PUNISHMENT
RICHARD LOWELL NYGAARD*

[E]xcept for totally deteriorated, drooling, hopeless psychotics of
long standing, and congenital idiots-who seldom commit murder or have the opportunity to commit murder-the great majority
and perhaps all murderers know what they are doing, the nature
and quality of their act, and the consequences thereof, and they
are therefore "legally sane" regardless of the opinion of any
psychiatrist.I

"T NSANITY"

no longer means anything useful either scientifiically or legally and should be stricken from our vocabulary.
Nor are "diminished capacity" and the few other terms we in law
use to denominate the myriad states of mind of much use to describe either the social danger or the remedial needs of an offender.2 Yet, such misleading terms continue, long beyond their
useful years, to mark the boundaries of criminal responsibility between certain criminal law offenders who will be treated with compassion, and the others who will be punished with vengeance.
In this Article, I posit that it is time to remove this line-drawing
based upon semantic nonsense of sanity/insanity and responsibility/nonresponsiblity, that is cast in a concrete, nonscientific theory,
defined by arcane nineteenth century terms that, scientifically and
jurisprudentially, are obsolete. It is also time to remove the determination of the accused's mental health from the procedural theater of the criminal trial and the ad hoc groups of lay citizens whom
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1. DR. GREGORY ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 274 (1943).

2. See State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I. 1981) (stating that diminished capacity doctrine recognizes that defendant was not suffering from mental
disease or defect that would eliminate all criminal responsibility because his
mental capacity was diminished by intoxication, trauma or mental disease, so as to
eliminate mental state or intent essential to particular offense charged).

(951)
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we call upon to decide issues of guilt. Instead, I suggest that we
place the primary emphasis about state of mind and receptivity to
corrective or punitive measures where it belongs, with a panel of
professionals, and at a hearing to determine what remedy is to be
employed, and what containing, correcting or punishing measures
3
are to be borne by the offender.
Ascertaining the accused's basic mental capacity is significant
to a threshold determination of who is capable of possessing a
guilty mind at all. But intent, we are discovering, is a rather low
threshold. An offender's state of mind, among many other factors,
should become of greater significance, I suggest, in determining
the reasons for the crime and to answer what should be the predominating question in the process: What shall we do with this person?4 The offender's sentence is supposed to be the remedy that
will provide a safeguard for society against further predations by the
offender, and it theoretically must be related to the gravity of the
damage that would ensue if the act or acts were repeated. Unfortunately, in reality sentencing does not accomplish this objective.
American penology is simply content to punish and seek revenge,
3. The idea is not novel, I must confess. Yet, it needs to be renewed. It was
first proposed by Dr. William White in 1911. Since then, many other professionals
from the health care disciplines have joined him. See, e.g., Justice Joseph Weintraub, Address to the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Federal Circuit
(June 25, 1964), in 37 F.R.D. 365, 369 (1964) (proposing that insanity as defense
should not bear on adjudication of guilt, but rather on prosecution following conviction); MANFRED S. GUTrMACHER, M.D., THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW 93
(1968) (discussing idea that whole psychiatric picture of defendant should be revealed by psychiatrists before deposition); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 12-29 (1964) (stating that courts should make efforts to assess
whether person accused of crime is mentally sound before convicting him); KARL
MENNINGER, M.D., THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 90-91 (1968) (stating that lawyers
and psychiatrists are miles apart in their thinking on human behavior based on
chronic misunderstanding and antagonism); THOMAS SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 248
(1963) (advocating sharp distinction between role of judges and that of behavior
scientists, and viewing compulsory counseling imposed by courts as "moral Fascism"); BARBARA WoorON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 32-84 (1963) (discussing generally penal or
preventative function of English courts and problem of mentally ill criminals in
England); Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
514, 515-19 (1968) (positing that psychiatrists do not function as successful healers
of mental illness in criminal justice system, and that those prominent in criminal
justice system reject idea of sanity as defense). I now join them.
4. Mens Rea remains a consideration in guilt, otherwise the process at least
under most current laws may become constitutionally infirm. See Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 261-62 (1952) (explaining that Congress's failure to
enumerate intent as element of crime does not mean statute will be construed as
eliminating intent, because of its importance in assessing existence of criminal
behavior).
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without regard for either the reasons for the crime or the consequences of the sentence.
Americans have an uneasiness about their penology, and for
good reason. When one considers the vindictive nature of our sentencing policy, it is easy to find some tension between our revengebased punishment, on the one hand, and the basic call to humanitarian consideration for our fellow citizens we claim to heed-and
the need for incapacitating remedies for those who have made a
decision to commit crimes-on the other. I suggest that the rancor, so evident in our sentencing scheme, adds nothing positive to
the equation we should use to determine what to do with the criminal (including the calculating or career criminal). The entire trial
procedure is cloaked in myth and formalistic ritual, for we seek dignity and order in such important decisions as dealing with criminal
guilt or innocence. But the calm of the trial is in stark contrast to
the psychological and physical cacophony that will follow for the
convicted criminal in prison. And surely the notion of what we call
retributivism, which is, in reality, revenge, 5 runs counter to the predominant American faiths, enlightened notions of human cultural
growth and social intercourse, the "moral bookkeeping" so fundamental to any rational correctional system and, significantly, the
6
discoveries of science.
5

5. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Philosophy of Sentencing: Or,Why Punish?,
L. 237, 247 n.45 (1996):
Some penologists labor greatly to distinguish "revenge," as being personal reprisal and outside the law, from "retribution," as being the law's
appropriate and somehow proportionate response. They fail. Retribution comes from the same place in the heart as revenge, and in the same
place etymologically-re means back and tribuere means to pay. Retribution and revenge are Humpty and Dumpty; and when they philosophically fall, they will shatter identically.

WIDENERJ. PUB.

Id.
6. Richard Lowell Nygaard, Freewill,Determinism, Penology, and the Human Genome: Where's a New Leibniz When. We Really Need Him?, 3 U. CH. ROUNDTABLE 417,
421-23 (1997).
[I]n many areas, the . . .rigidity of law places it in great conflict with
science, which yields constantly to new discoveries. This conflict is most
marked in the unreality of American criminal law. Our criminal law's
philosophy must presume that individuals have a totally free will because
our penology is motivated by revenge and the desire to punish offenders.... We seem to shun any evidence that might help us explore the
genesis of crime for fear that the evidence will indicate that our philosophical bases for criminal sentencing and our penal modes themselves
have fundamental shortcomings. Even worse, we fear being perceived as
"soft" on crime. As a result, we rely upon an unscientific, underdeveloped theory of responsibility and blameworthiness.
Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted). "In the last decade ...the evidence showing a
link between violence, crime and mental illness has mounted. It cannot be dis-
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Moreover, this uneasiness is most acute in the manner with
which the criminal justice system copes with one who suffers from
some mental impairment or a neurological or brain dysfunction,
and who violates the law. None of us wants to be considered a bully
for having taken advantage of either a mentally retarded individual,
a deranged person or one who suffers from some cognizable
mental disability. It is no surprise that we neither wish to execute
the mentally disabled nor place them in physical peril through imprisonment. We draw the line at doing something so outrageous.
It has, nonetheless, nothing to do with whether the accused "did it,"
or whether he is dangerous. Although a mentally disabled person
may be as dangerous or more so than the "normal" ward of the
criminal justice delivery system most of us do not want to be known
as being so callous that we would kill or imprison a mentally deficient or similarly disabled person.
Theoretically, we rationalize our policy by contending that we
want to be sure that before we inflict punishment upon one of our
fellow citizens, he is truly capable of being held to account and responsible for his acts. But when we consider the "line-drawing" in
which we engage to determine who will be killed, imprisoned, hospitalized, or who will be freed, the theory becomes bizarre. How we
decide upon a person's state of mind-the tests and how they are
applied-is a professional, philosophical and humanitarian
nightmare, as well as a cultural embarrassment. We use the fiction
of what is essentially a "yes/no" answer to one's "responsibility," to
avoid punishing the mentally deficient offender and, as a result,
7
seemingly infinite problems ensue.
It is fundamental to any enlightened legal system that each of
us must be held to account for our own actions. In any moral or
ethical system, most acutely in the criminal justice delivery system,
the basic concepts of "right" and "wrong" mean little if each individual is not required to account for applying them in the conduct of
missed; it should not be ignored." Peter Marzuk, Introduction,53 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 481, 481 (1996).
7. This conclusion also pertains to the trial of juveniles, whose status is created by law. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994) (defining 'Juvenile" as person who has not
attained age of eighteen). I see no reason why one offender who is just short of a
critical birthday should receive different treatment than one who has reached it.
One must query, at what age does one become responsible: 3 years, 4, 5, 16, 26?
The truth is that chronological age simply does not matter except to the extent
time has exposed one to the information necessary to make responsible decisions.
Some of us simply have not been given, or for various reasons have not developed,
the psychological, mental or social equipment necessary to make responsible, procultural decisions. Some of our citizens are part of the ecology of crime, not the
culture we try so desperately to advance.
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his or her own affairs. Our system shares with most other systems
the prerequisite to culpability for crimes that the offender not only
have "done" the act that the law forbids, but that he 8 also have a
threshold mental capacity to have done so with a specific or requisite will. That is to say, did he have the requisite free will to do

other than commit the crime, or was his behavior somehow determined by a mental disorder? 9 That which the law calls "insanity" is
an excusing condition that negates the voluntariness of an act-the
"responsibility" element-that is a mental pre-condition to punishment.10 Mental elements or conditions precedent to criminal "responsibility" are, in law, supposed to be a bright-line division
between offenders whom we call guilty (who are then held to account and receive condemnation, pain and punishment for their
transgressions) and those for whom we make various sanity declarations (who are relieved of responsibility and receive compassion,
treatment and care). Except in rare instances, these elements are
not very clear, and instead have become at once both a device for
avoiding punishment and a uselessly unscientific test for those who
truly need help. They also reveal the ill-will and hatred that is a
dark secret at the heart of our sentencing philosophy.

Why do we even have legal tests for insanity?1 ' Is it to make
sure the offender is capable of profiting from a sentence? Unfortunately, it is not. Our rationale for having these tests confirms that
8. Rather than use gender-neutral terminology, I have used the masculine because over 90% of those convicted of violent offenses are males. Kristen S. Caplice,
The Casefor Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 249 (1994);
Deborah W. Denno, Gender Crime, and the CriminalLaw Defenses, 85 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 80, 86 & nn.21-22 (1944); Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of
Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1441, 1457 n.76 (1995) (reviewing RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD

(1995)).

9. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 249-52 (1952) (explaining,
generally, importance of intent as element of crime).
10. Another such legally incapacitating condition is age. Juveniles are usually
not found guilty-instead they are declared delinquent. Again, the rationale is
responsibility. The juvenile is not considered to be fully, legally responsible for his
or her acts. Hence, like insanity for the adult, age often provides the juvenile a
defense to culpability. One must say "often," because public outrage over certain
heinous acts performed by juveniles, may sometimes cause prosecutors to prosecute the juveniles as adults. The motivation again, usually is the public's desire for
revenge, which overcomes the sympathy otherwise felt for children.
11. "Insanity," whatever that term means, originally served to define a whole
range of psychological and organic mental disorders and socially deviant behaviors. The term has now disappeared from our scientific vocabulary, replaced by a
myriad of descriptive terms used to qualify the various forms of mental illnesses
and behaviors. The word insanity anachronistically survives in our legal vocabulary, notwithstanding the fact that this construct has no medical counterpart. It is
defined in law by various circuli in probandi and legal mumbo-jumbo, typical of

which is "that degree or quantity of mental disorder which relieves one of the
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we are involved in sentencing with the most base of penal theories.
Four main philosophical rationalizations justify our punitive sentencing: deterrence, containment, rehabilitation and retribution.
Deterrence is coercion by fear. 12 Apologists for the general deterrence theory argue that by sentencing one person we will by ex13
ample cause others who would not otherwise do so to behave.
Under this theory, however, punishment of the mentally disabled
offender is justifiable because it will still influence others to refrain
from similar activity. Likewise, it would be irrelevant that the punishment did not affect the insane offender's behavior because punishing insane offenders would have positive consequences overall as
a result of the exemplary effects on other persons.
Under specific deterrence theory, a sentence is rationalized by
its effect on the offender actually being sentenced and its goal of
deterring him from committing other crimes. 14 With respect to the
mentally impaired, however, it is now apparent that even the simplest minds are capable of feeling fear. Research reveals that individuals, wherever they lie upon the mental continuum, can think in
some degree for themselves and learn lessons, in differing degrees,
from experience.' 5 A study by the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment regarding the mentally disabled and the law reveals
that "the great majority of the patients in mental hospitals, even
among the grossly insane [and the psychotic], know what [conduct] is forbidden by the rules [of the hospital] and that . . .
[breach of these rules may result in the] forfeit[ure of] some privicriminal responsibility for his actions." Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d 917, 919 (Nev.
1957).
12. Nygaard, supra note 5, at 253; see Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 731 n.127 (1937) (noting
that deterrence is "coercing an individual to refrain from the behavior in question
because of his fear of the unattractive legal consequences").
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 24 (2d ed.
1986) (noting general deterrence theorizes that "the sufferings of the criminal for
the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from committing future
crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate fate"); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 72-73
(1973) (noting difference between general and special [specific] deterrence).
14. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at 16 (15th ed.
1993) (stating that specific deterrence "is aimed only at the individual offender"
and that as result of punishment "he will refrain from crime in the future ... to
avoid further unpleasantness").
15. See GERTRUDE A. BARBER, SHELTERED EMPLOYMENT WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM (1975) (announcing much copied concept of "sheltered workshop" for mentally retarded, based on premise that everyone is capable of some productive
endeavor); see also Richard Lowell Nygaard, Is Prison An Appropriate Response to
Crime?, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 677, 686 (1996) (discussing Dr. Barber's "universally
successful theory" of "sheltered workshops").
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lege," 6 and hence, could theoretically be deterred. Under close
scrutiny, it becomes apparent that deterrence theories do not really
drive punishment in America. Deterrence is the reason most given
for punishing offenders, but it is, more than anything else, an excuse. We simply know too little about what deters crime, and what
it is about the process of detection, trial and punishment that deters. Indeed, it may not be the punishment at all, but rather, the
collateral effects of the entire process that cause one to modify
one's own behavior.
As rationalized by the "containment" theory, we incarcerate offenders to prevent them from committing other crimes.1 7 Containment, however, would work in substantially the same way on all
offenders regardless of their mental capacity. As such, containment
cannot be relied upon to account for our decisions regarding
whether to punish (criminals) or treat (the mentally deficient) as a
justification for sentencing them differently.
That rehabilitation would result from our system of punishment is a myth that has been largely abandoned as a philosophical
justification for sentencing-at least as it is now, when the sentence
is intended as a form of punishment which is executed by imprisonment.' 8 If one is reformed in prison it is because he reached down
inside himself, found something he did not like and changed it.
Offenders change in spite of prison, not because of it. Indeed, I
cannot imagine a worse place to recover from a lapse of morals
than prison.
I submit that under the first three penological theories, the
mental capacity of the offender is completely irrelevant. Only
16. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-53 REPORT 103 (1953)
[hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
17. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Myth of Punishment: Is American Penology
Ready for the 21st Century?, 5 REGENT U. L. REv. 1, 6 n.18 (1995) (discussing "containment" theory as device to protect society by containing criminals within walls of
prisons and mental hospitals). "Containment" theory is also commonly known as
"incapacitation" or "restraint" theory. See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, at
23 (noting premise behind incapacitation and restraint theories "is that society
.may protect itself from persons deemed dangerous because of their past criminal
conduct by isolating these persons from society"). For a compilation of articles
that discuss incapacitation, see DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds.,
1978).
18. See TORCH, supra note 14, at 18 (stating that rehabilitation does not "attempt to intimidate [i.e., punish] the offender" but rather to "instill[ ] . . . the
proper values and attitudes, by bolstering his respect for self and institutions"); see
also LAFAvE & Scor, supra note 13, at 24 (noting that it is incorrect to call rehabilitation punishment because "the emphasis is away from making him suffer and in
the direction of making his life better and more pleasant").
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under the retributivist theory does it matter if the offender is mentally, biologically or emotionally impaired, or wholly rational. Retribution is for the punisher, not the punished: Americans punish
their offenders because they are mad and want to "get even."1 9
And, simply put, our humanitarian concerns do not permit us to
pay back, get mad at, or "get even" with, a mentally disabled person
who draws sympathy and understanding, rather than anger and hatred, from us. So, one who may be truly dangerous but who falls
short of our unscientific and artificial criterion is deemed by our
legal standard to lack the necessary state of mind to permit us to
consider him "guilty" and subject him to our punitive sentencing
20
measures.
We say that we are punishing an offender based upon the offense he committed. We are disingenuous, however, when we claim
that the "punishment fit the crime." Serious penologists cannot
make such assertions without crossing their fingers behind their
backs. First, we have neither theoretical nor empirical data to support any sort of "fit." Second, if the punishment were to fit the
crime, as opposed to the individual, it would not matter whom we
are punishing-mentally responsible or otherwise-so long as this
individual actually performed the prohibited act.
I disagree fundamentally with the concept of proportionality
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 21 a case supporting a concept that parrots what numerous penologists have sug22
gested, and which is still followed by various state courts.
Proportionality is a necessary premise to define the outer limits of
19. See Lois FoPXR, A RAGE TO PUNISH 101 (1994) (stating that of those surveyed by Media General Poll in 1984 favoring death penalty, reason cited by most
of those people was desire for vengeance). "Killing by government no longer
evokes a sense of revulsion in many law-abiding Americans who roundly denounce
crime and violence. Vengeance as an appropriate response to wrongdoing is no
longer shunned. It has become respectable." Id.
20. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 13, at 304 (noting that purpose of insanity
defense "is .. .said to be that of separating out from the criminal justice system
those who should only be subjected to a medical-custodial disposition" as opposed
to full penal sanctions).
21. 463 U.S. 277 (1983), overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965

(1991).
22. See id. at 290 (holding that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to
the crime for which the defendant has been convicted"). The Supreme Court instructed future courts to determine the proportionality of a sentence by looking at
objective criteria consisting of three components. Id. at 292. First, a court should
examine the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. Id. Second, a
court should evaluate the sentence in question in light of those sentences imposed
in the same jurisdiction for more serious crimes. Id. Finally, a court should compare the sentence in question with those imposed for the same offense in other
jurisdictions. Id.
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penal pain. Yet, it answers few other deficiencies in the system. Indeed, we have flipped reasoning on its back and have made proportionality the reason-in-fact for the sentence-that is to say, we want
to make sure the criminal gets his full share of pain for what he did.
Proportionality confirms that punishment is driven by what one has
done and by a social desire for retribution. Society is angry, and the
conviction of an offender provides it with a forum in which to express both its odium for the act and an opportunity to express its
support for the law and the law-abiding. This permits citizens to
vent their aggressions in an officially legitimated and socially acceptable forum upon persons for whom few really carecriminals-and as a result, to feel they have "done something" to
fight crime.
Nonetheless, by providing this "sane/insane" mental "loophole" for some offenders, and for some crimes, American sentencing policy tacitly acknowledges that which it otherwise tries to deny:
23
Individuals are truly different and should be treated differently.
In Harmelin, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the
Court's holding in Solem as it applied to the proportionality theory, when he expressly stated that "Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965. While three other justices
had joined Justice Scalia's opinion that the defendant in Harmelin had not received
a sentence that constituted cruel and unusual punishment, they refused to join
Justice Scalia's rejection of a proportionality concept. See id. at 997 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that Eighth Amendment "encompasses a narrow proportionality principle"). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter,
stated that although the contours of a proportionality principle may not be as
broad as those alluded to in Solem, the principle should continue to be a part of
Eighth Amendment analysis in the form of a gross disproportionality standard. Id.
at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Four members of the Court, Justice White,
Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, stated that they would not
restrict Solem's proportionality analysis at all. Id. at 1009-27 (White, J., dissenting).
Although the Supreme Court has tried to shy away from application of the proportionality standard as it was applied in Solem, several state and federal courts have
continued to use a proportionality standard, at least the gross disproportionality
standard advocated by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin. See generally United States v.
Certain Real Property & Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29
(2d Cir. 1992) (applying proportionality standard advocated by Court in Solem);
United States v. Gordon, 953 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1992) (conducting review based
on Justice Kennedy's gross disproportionality standard discussed in Harmelin);
United States v. McLean, 951 F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle applies to noncapital sentences [as well as to capital offenses]"); State v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d 823 (Ariz. 1992) (concluding that Solem
survives Harmelin);Wingett v. State, 640 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1994) (upholding application of Solem proportionality standard); Speer v. State, 890 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994) (applying Salem when reviewing constitutionality of sentencing statute);
State v. Lewis, 447 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1994) (same).
23. HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, THE DISTURBED VIOLENT OFFENDER 162 &
n.7 (1994).
Seymour Halleck has observed:
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It is just that we move around the fulcrum of this teeter-totter according to the vagaries of the individual trial and jury, and the persuasive ability of the experts who testify. Consequently, this most
important decision becomes arbitrary and nearly meaningless to
any form or forum for an accurate and scientific determination of
mental capacity or impairment, the degree to which one's behavior
is capable of being changed and the appropriate remedy for changing it. Is it not high time that we in penology abandon the unscientific concept that there is a line beyond which some individuals, the
mentally or otherwise incompetent, lie? I think so. Rather, we
should recognize that there is a continuum upon which all persons-you, I and all offenders-lie, each having our own deficiencies, diseases, predilections, actuators and environments that
predispose some of us to culturally offensive behavior. Does not
each offender need his own brand and degree of behavior modification before being released into society again? Again, I think so.
Far removed from a scientific determination of who is responsible and required to bear the full brunt of prison and retribution,
mental condition has become a battleground in the adversarial culpability process in which we have totally lost sight of the preliminary
notions of criminal law: safety and behavioral control. Is it even
useful, when deciding upon guilt, to speak in terms of sanity or
mental illness? Given our tests, it is not. Mental health cannot be
divided into two categories-one for the fully rational and one for
the totally irrational. I suggest it is improper to fashion criminal
law on such a simplistic, nonscientific distinction. The mental or
emotional component of behavior is far too complex. Mental
health services are now a significant part of most hospitals' programs and, indeed, of many services now provided to employees. A
President's Commission on Mental Health found that at any given
time, one-fourth of all American citizens suffer from some form of

[I]n our current political climate, pressure is actually growing to avoid
examining psychological issues related to culpability by narrowing the insanity defense or doing away with practices associated with the diminished capacity doctrine.... By providing a loophole for dealing with the
worst possible cases [those in which the offender faces heavy penalties],
the insanity defense allows society to acknowledge that at least some offenders are different. This enables society to avoid the formidable
problems that would arise if it were to adopt a more flexible approach in
assessing the relationship of psychological disability to liability in the case
of all offenders.
SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 61 (1986).
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serious emotional distress. 2 4 One psychologist from the National
Institute of Health has said that almost no family is free of some
form of mental disorder. 25 Perhaps none of us is. As Lady Wootton
points out:
Nature knows only infinite gradations in both the physical
and the mental differences between members of the
human species, and it is even probable that not only does
one individual's responsibility for his actions differ from
that of another, but that the sense of responsibility in the
26
same individual may also vary from time to time.
It is, no doubt, a great simplification to say that not all mental
defectives are criminals and, correspondingly, that not all criminals
are mentally defective. Although it is true that those who break the
law are often "psychologically atypical," 27 offenders are different
from the law-abiding by the presence or absence of other shared
characteristics. Some people, mentally sound or not, are neither
sufficiently inhibited by the law nor by a concern over consequences to refrain from performing anti-social acts. Others do not
have sufficient social skills to cope with temptation or to resist acting out their aggression. Still others are pathologically incapable of
remaining within the cultural bounds set by our civilization. It is to
this last category that I now direct your attention.
The main test for what was (and unfortunately in law still is)
called insanity, comes from the famous M'Naghten rule announced
in 1843 by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case.2 8 In January of
that year, Daniel M'Naghten shot and killed Edward Drummond,
24. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, II REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH 27 (1978) (Report of the Task
Panel on Mental Health).
25. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE

THIRD WAVE

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY

6 (1978)).

365-66 (1980) (citing MARTIN L.

26. BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAw:
MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 91 (2d ed. 1981).

GROSS,

REFLECTIONS OF A

27. See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE
173 (1985) (noting that "populations of offenders differ statistically in various respects from populations of nonoffenders").
28. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). The Anglo-American tradition of relieving
one of criminal culpability for this amorphous group of mentally disabled persons
by reason of "madness" or "insanity" stems from developments during the reign of
Edward III (1326-1377). JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955). Criminal
laws are premised on the notion that all are capable of free and rational choice
between alternative modes of behavior, and that those who "choose" to commit
crimes are blameworthy. Unfortunately, by using this simplistic formula and by
dividing the offenders into blameworthy/not blameworthy, we lose sight of the
myriad of actuators that may come into play in any behavioral decision. For a
thorough discussion of M'Naghten's Case and its ramifications on English law, see
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who served as private secretary to the British Prime Minister, Sir
Robert Peel. 29 M'Naghten shot Drummond in broad daylight and

in the presence of a policeman.3 0 Investigators reported that
M'Naghten thought he was shooting the Prime Minister, whom
31
M'Naghten deluded was tormenting him.
English common law had a tradition of taking an offender's
mental state into account when deciding upon one's culpability for
a crime. 32 It held that one could only be punished for an offense
committed with a "guilty mind." 33 Children, the mentally retarded
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
McNAUGHTAN (1981).

29. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
30. MORAN, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting contemporaneous London Times account of incident in 1843). M'Naghten approached Drummond from behind "in
the open street, and in the broad face of day." Id. M'Naghten shot Drummond in
the back with one gun and prepared to shoot him again with a second gun when a
policeman, who had witnessed the event, seized him. Id. The second gun discharged in the struggle and, luckily, the bullet did not find a victim. Id.
31. BIGGS, supra note 28, at 98 (noting that when asked by police inspector if
he knew who he had shot, M'Naghten replied, "Yes-Sir Robert Peel").
M'Naghten believed that Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister and leader of the
Tory Party, was heading a conspiracy to persecute him. MORAN, supra note 28, at
10. M'Naghten's only public statement lucidly describes the delusion under which
he was operating:
The Tories in my native city have compelled me to do this. They follow,
persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed my peace of
mind. They followed me to France, into Scotland, and all over England.
In fact, they follow me wherever I go. I cannot sleep nor get no rest from
them in consequence of the course they pursue towards me. I believe
they have driven me into a consumption. I am sure I shall never be the
man I was. I used to have good health and strength but I have not now.
They have accused me of crimes of which I am not guilty, they do everything in their power to harass and persecute me; in fact, they wish to
murder me. It can be proved by evidence. That's all I have to say.
Id.
32. For a discussion of insanity under English common law, see BIGGS, supra
note 28, at 81-110; 1 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND (1968); FA.
WHITLOCK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 12-34 (1963); Homer D.
Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English CriminalLaw, 12 CAL. L.
REv. 105 (1924). Early English common law allowed insanity as a defense to common law felonies. Crotty, supra,at 110-11. The policy for allowing the defense was
that a felony required mens rea, and an insane person did not have the capacity to
have the requisite mens rea and thus, could not be punished. Id. A lunatic, it was
said, "is punished by his madness alone." Id. at 110.
33. See BIGGS, supra note 28, at 81 (noting requirement of "guilty mind" or
mens rea at English common law); Crotty, supra note 32, at 110-11 (noting that
English common law required mens rea); see also WHITLOCK, supra note 32, at 55:
"For some centuries, English law.., has made liability to punishment for
serious crime depend, not only on the accused doing the outward acts
which the law forbids, but on his having done them in certain conditions
which may broadly be termed mental ...[which] are commonly, though
rather misleadingly, referred to by lawyers as mens rea."
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and insane persons were generally not held criminally liable under

34
English common law.

Because it appeared that M'Naghten was surely insane, and
there was no great enthusiasm for punishing him, the primary object of the trial seemed to be that of establishing a connection between M'Naghten's insanity and the shooting. 35 This was easily
done, and M'Naghten was sentenced to spend the rest of his life in
36
an insane asylum.
That, however, was not the end of the case. The Queen was
dissatisfied with the verdict and, following review, the fifteen judges
of the English common law courts developed their tradition into a
legal doctrine defining the bounds of the mental abnormality defense to a criminal prosecution.3 7 This doctrine sets forth three
conditions for a successful insanity defense: (1) the accused must
have suffered from a defect of reason at the time he committed his
Id. (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 20
(1961)).
34. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331-32 (1989) (noting English common law prohibition against punishing "lunatics" and "idiots"); Sheila L. Sanders,
The Imposition of CapitalPunishment onJuvenile Offenders: Drawingthe Line, 19 S.U. L.
REv. 141, 144 (1992) ("Under English Common Law, children under the age of
seven could not be charge[d] with a crime in criminal court."); Lawrence A. Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishmentfor Minors: Contemporary Standards and the
Dignity ofJuveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 769 n.67 (1986) (noting under English common law that children under age of seven were not held criminally responsible for
their acts); see also Crotty, supra note 32, at 113 (stating that early treatises on English common law held that "[children] under the age of discretion, ideots and
lunaticks, are not punishable by any criminal prosecution whatsoever").
35. See BIGGs, supra note 28, at 95-103 (discussing trial of M'Naghten and issue
of insanity). Nine expert witnesses testified on M'Naghten's behalf that he was
insane at the time of the shooting, including, indirectly, Dr. Isaac Ray, whose justpublished book on insanity and the law was presented at trial as relevant authority
on the issue. Id. at 100-01. Before introducing the contents of Ray's book on
M'Naghten's behalf, counsel for M'Naghten held the book in the air, exclaiming,
"I hold in my hand perhaps the most scientific treatise that the age has produced
upon the subject of insanity in relation to jurisprudence." Id. at 100. The expert
testimony was so convincing as to M'Naghten's insanity that the judges cut the trial
short and promptly submitted the question of M'Naghten's sanity to the jury. Id.
at 101-02.
36. See id. at 102 (noting that jury returned verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity and M'Naghten was removed to state hospital where he resided until his
death in 1865).
37. Id. at 103. The verdict in M'Naghten's trial received sharp criticism in
England. Id. at 102-03. Newspaper editorials claimed M'Naghten had been "profitably insane," feigning insanity to escape punishment. Id. Others criticized the
court for being too lenient and even naive. Id. at 102. The Queen entered the fray
by writing a letter to the Prime Minister (who was, coincidentally, the intended
target of M'Naghten's bullet) that criticized the M'Naghten's Case verdict. Id. at
103. The Queen's letter prompted the House of Lords to consider the parameters
of the insanity defense by reviewing the M'Naghten verdict. Id.
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act; (2) the defect must result from a disease of the mind; and (3)
as a result of this defect the accused did not know what he was doing, or if he knew what he was doing, did not know that it was
wrong. 38
That the test even survived is amazing. It was quickly denounced, primarily because it failed to take into account the myriad of other reasons why one may breach the rules, knowing them
to be injunctions but having insufficient ability to resist breaching
them. 39 With the focus only upon punishment, even early critics
38. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). Lord Chief Justice
Tindal formulated what would become known as the M'Naghten test as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Id. Courts and criminologists have struggled since to decide whether this means
"moral" or "legal" wrong. See Herbert Fingarette, Disabilitiesof Mind and Criminal
Responsibility-A Unitay Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 236, 255 n.49 (1976) (noting
confusion caused by ambiguity over whether defendant must know act was "morally" or "legally" wrong); see also BIGGS, supra note 28, at 108 (noting ambiguity in
M'Naghten's Case use of term "wrong," which can be interpreted as meaning either
"legally" or "morally" wrong); LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 13, at 315-16 (discussing
distinction between "morally" and "legally" wrong). Some courts have taken the
view that a defendant must simply not know that the act performed was "morally"
wrong. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 946 (N.Y. 1915) (holding defendant was not liable for acts committed when he was unable to distinguish between
right and wrong in moral sense). Other courts have required that a defendant not
know that the act was "legally" wrong. E.g., State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183
(Iowa 1979) ("The test is not how much law a person claiming an insanity defense
actually knows. The determination is to be made on the basis of a person's ability
to understand it when something is prohibited by law."); State v. Crenshaw, 659
P.2d 488, 492 (Wash. 1983) (requiring that defendant not know that act was "contrary to the law"). This latter view is clearly the view in England, where M'Naghten's
Case is now interpreted to require that a defendant must lack the knowledge that
the act was "legally" wrong. See, e.g., Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826, 834 (1952)
(ruling that defendant must not know act was "legally" wrong in order to validly
claim insanity defense).
The significance of this distinction between "morally" wrong and "legally"
wrong is best illustrated by a classic hypothetical. If A kills B, knowing that he is
killing B, and knowing that it is illegal to kill B, but under an insane delusion that
God has commanded him to kill B because the salvation of the human race depends upon A killing B, then A is guilty if the word "wrong" is taken in its legal
sense, but A is "not guilty by reason of insanity" if "wrong" is understood in its
moral sense. 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 149 (1883).

39. See generally WHrrLOCK, supra note 32, at 35 (stating that "[firom their inception the [M'Naghten] Rules have been subjected to constant criticism from both
legal and medical commentators," and discussing common criticisms). The Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment summarized criticism of the M'Naghten rules
as follows:

[T]he M'Naghten test is based on an entirely obsolete and misleading
conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does not only, or pri-
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decried how in a civilized system we could punish others who,
40
although not mentally deficient, could not have obeyed the rules.
Moreover, applied literally the rule required total incapacitation of
the offender's cognitive faculty to escape responsibility and punishment. The offender simply must not have been able to "know."
This is an unworkable, intellectually dishonest and scientifically absurd rule.
One year later, in Commonwealth v. Rogers,41 a Massachusetts
judge expanded the doctrine to include some who were able to distinguish right from wrong. 42 He instructed his jurors that they
could acquit the accused if the mental disease "overwhelmed the
[defendant's] reason, conscience and judgment," and if the jurors
found that he was acting "from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse." 4 3 In 1859, the courts added another wrinkle to the "responsibility" fabric, when a jury acquitted United States Congressman Daniel Sickles 44 of killing his wife's paramour, finding Sickles
to be suffering from "temporary insanity. '45 Over time, other modimarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual faculties, but affects the whole
personality of the patient, including both the will and the emotions. An
insane person may therefore often know the nature and quality of his act
and that it is wrong and forbidden by law, but yet commit it as a result of
the mental disease.
CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 16, at 80; see also SAMUELJ. BRAK EL & RONALD S.
ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 386 (1971) (noting that "[s] ince their
promulgation the M'Naghten rules have been subjected to a constant stream of
criticism").
40. LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 13, at 318 (stating that some commentators
criticize M'Naghten's Case "because it only takes account of impairment of cognition and ignores impairment of volitional capacity").
41. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844).
42. Id. at 500-02. In Rogers, the defendant was a convict who had killed a
prison warden by stabbing him in the neck with a knife. Id. at 501. The defendant
claimed he had been insane at the time of the act, and extensive expert testimony
was introduced on the matter. Id. The judge instructed the jury that if it found
that "the disease existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment" and that the defendant "in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse," then
the defendant's "act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of
the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it." Id. at 502.
43. Id.; see WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 504 (noting that this "'irresistible impulse' [instruction] was a way of broadening the range of mental disease
that could excuse an offender, adding a defect in volition to the purely cognitive
defects allowed by the M'Naghten test").
44. For the transcript of the Sickles trial, see The Trial of DanielE. Sickles for the
Murder of Philip Barton Key, 12 Am.ST. TRIALS 494 (1859) [hereinafter Trial of Daniel
E. Sickles].
45. Trial of DanielE. Sickles, supra note 44, at 760-62. The trial of Sickles involved a sensational case that became known as the "Sickles-Key Affair." Sickles
was a Congressman in Washington, D.C., who had become friendly with Philip
Barton Key, a United States Attorney who was also the son of Francis Scott Key, the
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fications were proposed to this largely unworkable doctrine of responsibility to make it malleable to the facts of the more
troublesome cases. But as with all rules of law, this one did not
change quickly. Indeed, when one considers the tremendous advances made in the fields of medicine, psychiatry, psychology and
sociology in the past 150 years, one must conclude that the law virtually has stood still.
The next significant change came in 1871, when the New
Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the M'Naghten rule as inadequate in State v. Jones.46 The court promulgated a new rule: "[T] he
verdict should be 'not guilty by reason of insanity' if the killing was
47
the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant."
This formulation did not attract attention until 1954 in the case of
Durham v. United States.48 In Durham, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit repudiated M'Naghten's
"nature" and "illegality" knowledge schemes, which Justice Frankauthor of the "Star Spangled Banner." Judicial Conference-Second Circuit, 153
F.R.D. 375, 439 (1992). Sickles had aided Key in his reappointment as a United
States Attorney. Id. Unbeknownst to Sickles, Key was having an affair with Sickles's
wife, Theresa. Id. Key would come to the Sickles house waving a white handkerchief, signaling to Theresa that it was time for a rendezvous. Id. When Sickles
somehow became aware of the affair, he waited for Key to arrive, and upon the
wave of the handkerchief Sickles emerged from his home and gunned Key down.
Id. At trial, Sickles advanced the defense of temporary insanity. Allen D. Spiegel &
Peter B. Suskind, A Paroxysmal Insanity Plea in an 1865 Murder Trial, 16 J. LEGAL
MED. 585, 591 (1995). It appears from the acquittal that the jury accepted Sickles's
claim that he had been overcome by an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse
and had been temporarily insane when he shot Key, notwithstanding his uncontested premeditation. Id.
46. 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
47. Id. at 398. The defendant in Jones killed his wife after learning of her
infidelity. Id. at 372. The court reasoned that "[i]f the defendant had an insane
impulse to kill his wife, which he could not control, then mental disease produced
the act. If he could have controlled it, then his will must have assented to the act,
and it was not caused by disease, but by the concurrence of his will, and was therefore a crime." Id. at 399.
48. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court in Durham adopted the "product" approach
originally enunciated by the New Hampshire court in New Hampshire v. Jones, 50
N.H. 369, 398 (1871). Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75 n.48. In Durham, the defendant
had a long history of mental illness and was appealing his conviction for housebreaking, claiming that the test for criminal responsibility applied at his trial was
obsolete. Id. at 864-65. The court found that the M'Naghten "right-wrong" test,
even when supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" test, was inadequate because
it was too narrow. Id. at 871-74. Instead, the court adopted the approach in Jones,
and held that a person "is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect." Id. at 874-75 (emphasis added). In
1972, however, the same court overruled its holding in Durham and adopted in its
place the Model Penal Code approach to determining criminal responsibility.
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973. For the Model Penal Code's approach to criminal responsibility, see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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furter had labeled "in large measure shams. '49 Under the Durham
"product" test, an offender would not be held responsible if his act,
while otherwise criminal, "was the product of mental disease or
mental defect." 50 Hence, relevant inquiry under Durham is directed
toward medically informed concepts of mental health rather than
lay conjecture as to the defendant's total incapacity to make moral
judgments.
Later, the Model Penal Code recommended further practical
revisions to the rule of responsibility. According to the Code: "A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
or to
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
51
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."

In United States v. Currens,52 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit announced a formula for describing criminal
responsibility that rejected the approaches taken by the courts in
M'Naghten and Durham.53 There we said: "The jury must be satisfied
49. HENRY
CRIME 61 (1956).
LEM OF MENTAL IRRESPONSIBILITY FOR
WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH:

NEW APPROACHES TO THE PROB-

50. Durham,214 F.2d at 875. For a discussion of the "product" test adopted in
Durham, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, at 286-92 (discussing workings and
elements of Durham test); Edward de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI.
L. REv. 339, 342-48 (1955) (same); William 0. Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Groundfor Lawyers and Psychiatrists,41 IowA L. REv. 485, 488-95 (1956) (discussing Durham from psychiatrists' point of view); Herbert Wechsler, The Criteria of
Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 368-76 (1955) (criticizing Durham
test).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985). For a discussion of the Model Penal
Code approach, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, at 292-95. The most significant difference between the Model Penal Code approach and the M'Naghten and
"irresistible impulse" tests is that the Model Penal Code presents a much less rigid
threshold, requiring merely a lack of substantial capacity to understand that the
act is illegal or to conform to the requirements of the law. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra
note 13, at 330. A number of courts of appeal have adopted some variation of the
Model Penal Code approach. See, e.g., Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973 (overruling Durham
and adopting Model Penal Code rule while supplying its own definition of "mental
disease or defect"); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968) (leaving duty of determining precise wording of jury instruction to trial court, but requiring that three questions based on Model Penal Code be answered); United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1969) (praising Model Penal Code
formulation but refusing to require any uniform instruction); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963) (adopting essential elements of Model
Penal Code formulation).
52. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
53. Id. at 774. We criticized both tests as being too rigid for assuming that the
mind "can be broken up into compartments, one part sane and the other insane,"
instead of "determining the total mental condition of the defendant at the time he
committed the [criminal] act." Id.
In Currens, the defendant stole a car in Ohio and abandoned it at the airport
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Id. at 752. In his confession, Currens told the FBI
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that at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as
a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is
alleged to have violated."5 4 Otherwise, the defendant must be
found to possess the guilty mind necessary to constitute his or her
prohibited act a crime. 55 In creating a new formula for the circuit's
that he was not sure where he had left the car, and suggested that he may have
driven it in New York City. Id. When interviewed by an FBI agent two weeks later,
Currens could barely recall his prior statement to the FBI. Id. Dr. Maurice Bowers, a Pittsburgh neuropsychiatrist, testified that Currens had acted without due
regard for the consequences of his criminal behavior, and that his illegal and antisocial conduct was a repetitive outgrowth of his personality. Id. at 756. Dr. Bowers
stated that Currens had a "sociopathic personality" with a schizophrenic tendency
and thus, could not be considered a "mentally healthy person." Id. Dr. Bowers
considered a sociopathic personality to constitute mental illness but not, in the
legal sense, insanity. Id.
The court charged the jury with instructions based on the M'Naghten rules,
while Currens's counsel had requested, in addition, a jury charge that incorporated the Durham "product" test, which the court refused to apply. Id. at 757-58.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Id. at 758. Currens appealed and asserted that
the proper jury instructions would have been ones that referenced the Durham
formula. Id.
54. Id. at 774. We stated that we had created our test by incorporating language from the test proposed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code and the test suggested by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. Id.
at n.32. Although we approved of portions of the Model Penal Code provision, we
were uncomfortable with the phrase "'to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."' Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft No.1,
1961)). We believed that such a "phrase would overemphasize the cognitive element in criminal responsibility and thus distract the jury from the crucial issues
while being little more than surplusage." Id. For the text of the Model Penal Code
provision to which we alluded in Currens,see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
We were certainly more comfortable with part (c) of the test developed by the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which stated that "' [t] he jury must be
satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of the
disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) (a) did not know the nature and quality
of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing
himself from committing it."' Currens, 290 F.2d at 774 n.32 (quoting CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 16, cmt. 8932, at 110-11, 117-18). In Currens,we rejected parts
(a) and (b) of the report of the Royal Commission because those parts paralleled
the M'Naghten rules. Id.
55. Currens, 290 F.2d at 775. In Currens, we considered an acceptable jury
instruction to be:
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
Currens, was not suffering from a disease of the mind at the time he
committed the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe that he was suffering from a disease of the mind, but believe beyond
a reasonable doubt that at the time he committed the criminal conduct
with which he is charged he possessed substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that Currens was not suffering from a disease of the mind or that
despite that disease he possessed substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated
you must find him not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, your task would
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courts, our opinion in Currensexpressly criticized the doctrines set
forth in MNaghten and Durham.56 We stated that the MNaghten and
Durham doctrines were inappropriate because they were premised
on the theory that the mental illness of an insane person causes
him to commit the criminal act,5 7 and held that a court should consider that because of his illness, the defendant has lost the capacity
to control his acts in the ways a normal person controls them.5 8 In
Currens,we concluded that if a defendant has lost the ability to connot be completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered
from a disease of the mind. He would still be responsible for his unlawful
act if you found beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he committed that act, the disease had not so weakened his capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of that law. These questions must be determined by you
from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the evidence in
this case.
Id.
56. Id. at 773-74. We considered the M'Naghten rules to be unfair to the individual defendant and dangerous to society. Id. at 767. We opined that a test based
on knowledge of right and wrong is essentially meaningless because many insane
or mentally ill patients know the difference between right and wrong. Id. at 765.
In addition, we noted:
"So long as the courts judge criminal responsibility by the test of knowledge of right and wrong, psychotics who have served prison terms or are
granted probation are released to commit increasingly serious crimes, repeating crime and incarceration and release until murder is committed.
Instead of being treated as are ordinary criminals, they should be cdnfined to institutions for the insane at the first offense and not be released
until or unless cured."
Id. at 767 (quoting BIGOS, supra note 28, at 144-45). We thus concluded that releasing an untreated and uncured mentally ill offender from jail and placing him
back into the general public "presents a great and immediate danger." Id.
When analyzing the Durham "product" test, we opined that a test for criminal
responsibility should incorporate the concept that "where there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether a particular person possesses capacity . . . to conform his
conduct to society's standards there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the necessary guilty mind." Id. at 773. We concluded that the Durham
formula did not meet this requirement. Id. We interpreted the Durham formula as
requiring proof that the act committed was not the product of mental disease or
defect. Id. Thus, the Durham formula stresses a possible causal connection between the defendant's mental disease and his criminal act. Id. This suggests that
the defendant's mental disease produces some acts but not others. Id. at 773-74.
The formula, however, wrongly assumes that the mind can be broken up into a
sane compartment and an insane compartment. Id. at 774. Therefore, we concluded in Currens that the Durham formula omitted the most important step in the
adjudication of criminal responsibility: a determination of the total mental condition of the defendant at the time he committed the act, in order to provide the
factfinder with the means to render an ultimate social and moral judgment. Id.
57. Id. Instead, the court should determine the "total" mental condition of
the defendant at the time of the alleged crime. Id.
58. Id. Therefore, it is not the mental defect, but the "total personality"
which, as a result of mental illness, is responsible for the lack of control. Id.
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trol his actions because of a mental illness, he cannot possess the
59
requisite mens rea to consider his act a crime.
All of these tests made important and needed changes to the
rules of responsibility. Now, throughout the states, several variations on these main themes guide jurors in the critical decisions
they must make with respect to a person's mental capacity.
Although Currens comes closest, none of these tests confronts the
reality that clear and definite rules are necessary for jurors who
must decide these weighty issues, and such simplistic tests cannot
account for the human psyche's myriad of variables nor for the offender who is defensively using these definitions as a strategy to es60
cape punishment for his criminal acts.

In reality, mental condition and the psychological components
of behavior are more liquid than solid. Moreover, none of these
doctrines recognizes that trained professionals should be the ones
who determine a defendant's mental capacity, not lay persons who
must sift through masses of often incomprehensible, or at least uncomprehended, data to make life and death decisions.
A part of the problem is philosophical: We are content to rely
upon the myth of punishment as the panacea for crime. 6 1 This triggers a host of constitutional considerations that treatment does not.
In reality, however, inflexible rules and myths can neither adequately educate jurors nor adequately differentiate between the varying personal motivations one might possess or actuate when
committing a crime. Thus, it is the ambiguity of a mental test that
would permit a court to transmute the test to fit each case-precisely that which rule-makers seek to eliminate-or would permit a
court to simplify an otherwise incomprehensible explanation for a
lay jury.
59. Id. Thus, a lack of volition becomes an inability to form specific intent
and the insanity defense becomes not an affirmative defense, but rather, a negation of the prosecution's burden.
60. See, e.g., Edward Felsenthal, Man's Genes Made Him Kill, His Lawyers Claim,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at B1, B5 (reporting that confessed killer's lawyers ar-

gued that killer's genes may have predisposed him to commit crime). In 1993,
Harvard University neuroscientists released a study identifying a particular gene
mutation in an extended family in which men seemed unusually prone to violence.
Id. at B1. I do not ridicule the possibility of genetic influence on behavior. Genetic discoveries, however, are further evidence that our binary "sane/not sane"
culpability determination is obsolete. See also Nygaard, supra note 5, at 239 (noting
"the genesis of crime is not a single issue").
61. See Nygaard, supra note 17, at 12 (concluding that myth of punishment is
dangerous because urge to punish, although emotionally gratifying to some, ignores rational and constructive solutions to protect society).
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With contemporary psychiatric and psychological data, the legitimate experts, who must testify about mental conditions, are unable to make accurate and scientific determinations fit into the
rigid legal definitions the law imposes. 62 Our current process systemically eliminates what is psychiatrically sound or psychologically
workable, leaving us with a test for responsibility that may have no
relationship at all to whether the offender needs help, punishment,
confinement or a combination of all three. Moreover, it is my experience that contrary to the law,jurors filter out the law'sjargon, and
on the basis of their intuitive sense ofjustice simply decide whether,
irrespective of expert advice and testimony, they think the offender
is "nuts."
Trials in which a jury must decide upon the accused's guilt
based upon the contradictory testimony of experts, result in "battles
of experts" that virtually assure arbitrary outcomes. 63 With the freedom of the accused and the safety of society at stake, this is not
good enough. I have urged, and continue to urge, that we abandon the myth of punishment as the raison d'etre of the criminal
trial. 64 We must begin to think of penology as an adaptable and
multi-disciplinary process that can examine, accept and implement
proposed solutions derived from scientific discoveries if those solutions will help us reach a realistic goal-in this instance, public
safety.
The current practice of determining responsibility and state of
mind as a predicate to culpability, however, is in great tension with
science and practical reality. American penal theory was developed
200 years ago and reflected eighteenth century theories of mind65
body dualism, with the mind or soul as the source of behavior. It
62. See, e.g., Edwin I. Megargee, Forewordto TOCH & ADAMs, supranote 23, at xv

(noting that "Toch and Adams' research demonstrates that offenders committing
the same crime may differ greatly from one another with respect to the chronicity
of their offending, the role, if any, played by substance abuse, the danger they pose
to themselves and others, and their needs for mental health programming").
Megargee states that despite this research, legislators are increasingly eager to propose simplistic solutions, such as fixed mandatory sentences for a variety of of-

fenses. Id.
63. As I used to advise myjuries: "No one is smarter than one expert. No one

is dumber than two."
64. See generally Nygaard, supra note 17, at 1-12 (commenting that philosophy
of punishment to protect society will not prepare American penology for twenty-

first century). America needs to discover causes and motives of crime as well as to

rehabilitate criminals, rather than build more prisons. Id. at 12; cf. United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) (noting that rehabilitation is no longer goal of
sentencing under Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
65. See Nygaard, supra note 5, at 239-41 (discussing views of primary eighteenth century reformers of penology).
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still does. Modem science, contrarily, is beginning to view the
brain and the body more as a holistic biological system, that ex66
presses itself within and with a complex social ecology.
66. SeeANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
3-14 (1994) (discussing case history of Phineas Gage, 25-year old
construction foreman whose entire demeanor and personality changed when an
explosion sent steel rod through front of his brain, exiting through top of his
head). Phineas Gage, a five-foot-six athletically built man, worked for the Rutland
& Burlington Railroad in 1848, laying down tracks in Vermont. Id. at 3. While
preparing to detonate large rocks, Gage was distracted by nearby conversation and
accidentally tamped the explosive powder with an iron bar, causing the powder to
ignite. Id. at 4. The ensuing explosion was so fierce that the iron bar flew through
Gage's hand, entered his left cheek, pierced the base of his skull, traversed the
front of his brain and exited through the top of his head at high speed, landing
more than one hundred feet away. Id. That Gage was not killed instantly was truly
amazing, as evidenced by local newspaper reports. Id. at 5. What was even more
shocking was the account of the incident reported by the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal: Following the explosion, Gage exhibited a few convulsive motions,
spoke within a few minutes thereafter, was carried onto an ox cart in which he sat
erect during the trip to a nearby hotel and got out of the cart himself with some
assistance from his co-workers. Id. He was pronounced cured in less than two
months (he was, however, blind in one eye). Id. at 7.
Although Gage survived this ordeal, he no longer was the Phineas Gage his
friends and colleagues had come to know. Id. One account of Gage's recovery
noted that although he had no speech or language problems, "the equilibrium or
balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculty and animal propensities had
been destroyed." Id. at 8. Once the acute phase of his brain injury subsided, it
became apparent just how different a person Phineas Gage had become:
[He was] fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity
which was not previously his custom, manifesting but little deference for
his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflict[ed] with his
desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating,
devising many plans of future operation, which [were] no sooner arranged than they [were] abandoned.
Id. Gage used language so foul that women were advised to stay away from him, yet
Gage failed to return to good behavior. Id. Employers could not work with him,
and he was routinely dismissed for poor discipline or, instead, quit in a "capricious
fit." Id. at 8-9. Soon, he became a circus attraction at Barnum's Museum in New
York City, displaying his wounds for those who had interest. Id. at 9. Eventually,
Phineas Gage's life disintegrated completely. Unable to hold a job, Gage ended
up in San Francisco, drinking and brawling until his death on May 21, 1861, as a
result of severe epileptic seizures. Id. at 9-10.
According to Damasio:
Gage's example indicated that something in the brain was concerned specifically with unique human properties, among them the ability to anticipate the future and plan accordingly within a complex social
environment; the sense of responsibility toward the self and others; and
the ability to orchestrate one's survival deliberately, at the command of
one's free will.
Id. at 10. Before Gage's experience, scientists' understanding of the brain was
quite limited. Id. Following Gage's ordeal, however, scientists came to realize an
exceptional truth: "The observance of previously acquired social convention and
ethical rules could be lost as a result of brain damage, even when neither basic
intellect nor language seemed compromised." Id. Somehow, there existed in the
human brain systems that were dedicated to the personal and social dimensions of
reasoning. Id. Gage had once had a sense of personal and social responsibility,
HUMAN BRAIN
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I am not sure if we can prove that one has a "mind" or a "soul,"
or describe the thought processes of the brain. We do know, however, that we each have a brain, nervous system and genes that
make us the individuals we are. I am not sure if one can adequately
describe "insanity" or "mental illness" so that they are workable concepts that a jury can use when assessing the guilt of an accused. We
do know, however, that if physiological diseases, pathologies and
brain or neurological dysfunctions exist in the offender, we can scientifically establish specific neurologic diagnoses. 67 Then brain defects, mental illness, retardation, emotional stress or genetics, if
they are the reason for the offending act, can provide solid scientific bases for treatment or penal options, rather than simply conflicting bits of evidence that lead to what may be an arbitrary
decision by twelve lay persons, followed by another almost-arbitrary
decision on how to sentence the offender. Science is an enterprise
to discover, to propose solutions for, and to answer ultimate questions such as these. 6 8 It is time to bring law into alignment with
exemplified by the ways in which he had advanced within his employment, cared
for the quality of his work and related to his employers and colleagues. Id. at 11.
Nevertheless, following his accident, Gage lost all respect for social convention,
violated all sorts of ethical standards and made decisions without regard to his best
interests. Id.
In his discussion of Phineas Gage, Damasio posits that Gage's dilemma was
that he was a victim of dissociation-Gage'sdegenerated character was at odds with
the intactness of his attention, perception, memory, language and intelligence. Id.
Other patients who have lesions located on different parts of the brain, exhibit
somewhat different forms of dissociation,such as where the patient's language skills
have been impaired while character and all other cognitive skills remain intact,
thereby confirming that dissociation like that suffered by Phineas Gage is not entirely unique. Id. at 12. If nothing else, the story of Phineas Gage reveals just how
complex the human brain truly is, and that we still have much to learn about the
role it plays in our social development and existence.
67. See generally Pamela Y. Blake et al., Neurologic Abnormalities in Murderers,
NEUROLOGY, Sept. 1995, at 1641-46 (reporting results of neurologic study of 31
murderers between 1989 and 1993). Dr. Blake, along with Dr. Jonathan H. Pincus
and Dr. Cary Buckner, established specific neurologic diagnoses in 20 of these 31
subjects. Id. at 1643.
68. Nygaard, supra note 6, at 421-22 n.l1.
Development in science is nearly the antipole of development in the law
and the legal system. In science, a proposition is only stated as law after
scientists: (1) observe a phenomenon; (2) hypthesize about it; (3) test it;
and (4) rule out alternative hypotheses with repeated observation and
testing. In addition, the proposition must be generally accepted by the
scientific community and substantiated by colleagues and critics who replicate the original studies. In contrast, within the legal system and more
specifically the criminal justice system, the law posits and defines the
norm and, hence, the deviations. Hypotheses need not be accurate, only
popular. Indeed, under the case law method, a decision reached by a
court in one case is law and likely to control many others until determined by the court, a reviewing court, or a legislature to be wrong.
Id. (citation omitted).
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reality and science. Science can help us to determine whether the
offender presents us with a moral problem or a medical problem
69
we must rectify.
To me, the traditional retrospective approaches to the accused's state of mind as preconditions to a ritual passage through
the criminal justice screen toward, and to rationalize, punishment
are absurd. Indeed, these approaches successfully divert our attention from appropriate, prospective and problem-solving approaches
to behavior control. I submit that each traditional philosophical
justification for punishment is seriously flawed, not just from difficulties of proof and the realities of misuse, but because nothing in a
convicted offender's past can fully justify what we do now in the
70
form of a prison sentence for any offender we intend to release.
The past is useful only as a portion of the diagnosis by which we
must determine how to correct or contain the offender and prevent
future infractions.
As I have suggested, it makes no sense at all to consider "sanity"
when deciding culpability. All humans lie along a mental continuum some place between Zilboorg's "drooling idiot" and the theoretical, entirely rational and calculating being. 7 1 A person's
position on the continuum means little to the equation of criminality-all of us are capable of antisocial acts. I suggest that we abandon the polemic of sanity as solely a function of determining
culpability, and instead turn our greatest attention to mental condi69. See generally Blake et al., supra note 67, at 1641-46 (discussing how neurologic impairment may contribute to violence); C. RayJeffery, Ph.D. et al., Crime,
Justice, and Their Systems: Resolving the Tension, 16 CRIMINOLOGIST 1, 5 (July-Aug.
1991) ("New knowledge of human behavior can be used to prevent crime. Crime
prevention can be either at the individual level or environmental level. Several
examples of crime prevention at the individual level can be cited. People who are
violent are often low in the neurotransmitter serotonin. Serotonin is a product of
amino acids which can be gotten from diet or from health food stores. Violent
offenders have been shown to have abnormal levels of nutrient minerals and high
levels of toxic minerals such as lead, cadium, mercury, and aluminum. A California study involving prison inmates found excessive levels of manganese in hair
samples taken from the inmates. Cocaine releases and then depletes the
dopamine and serotonin supplies in the brain.").
70. See generally Michael Vitello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REv.
1011 (1991) (suggesting that rehabilitation should be reconsidered in sentencing). Vitello asserts that retributive punishment ignores the offender's ability to
transform into a more developed, moral person. Id. at 1049-50. Thus, when transformation occurs, it is difficult to find a continuing justification for imposing suffering that is based on past behavior. See id. at 1051 (noting that if offender
transforms himself into new person, law cannot punish him for act of another).
71. See ZILBOORG, supra note 1, at 274 (stating that most individuals, including
most criminals, know what they are doing, nature of their acts and consequences
of their actions).
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tion and capacity after the factfinder has determined, in a
"whether" portion of a trial, that the accused "did it." The court
can then determine "why" the offender committed the act, and employ the finding or findings to develop the appropriate punitive,
remedial and/or corrective measures (or some combination
thereof). "Sanity," "diminished capacity" and "insanity," whatever
they mean, are only bits of semantic nonsense that we should remove from the "whether" portion of the trial. Crimes should be
redefined so that mental condition is left to the calculus of what
must be done to one after there has been a determination that the
defendant has offended our criminal rules and is a danger to him72
self or to others.
I suggest that we consider revising our penal codes and trial
procedures to limit the extent of the initial trial or plea of admission to whether the accused performed an act that fits the legal
definition of something that has been declared a crime. A positive
finding or a plea of admission on that issue would then bring the
accused to a status that would require the court to consider remedial measures to be employed, such as containment, punishment,
therapy, release or total pardon and discharge, or some combination of those measures. 73 This procedure would apply to all offenders, wherever they may lie along the mental condition continuum.
I submit that the criminal justice delivery system should deal
with defendants who claim a mental deficiency by bifurcating those
individuals' trials into two stages: (1) a trial phase to determine
whether the accused performed the forbidden act; followed by (2)
a second phase to discover the reasons why the offender committed
the act and whether it was a product of the will or determined in
whole or part by genetics, emotional stress, mental defect or any
combination of a host of reasons.7 4 The first phase would focus
72. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 39, at 421 (suggesting specifically that "[a]
thorough mental examination by a panel of impartial experts should be available
to all persons accused of serious crime and should be mandatory for all defendants
raising the issue of criminal irresponsibility, provided that the procedural protections of a criminal proceeding be made applicable to such examination"). I fully
endorse their suggestion.
73. Carol Isaac Barash, The Insanity Defense: Legal IncoherenceEquals Conceptual
Confusion, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (PROCEEDINGS OF THE
12TH INTERNATIONAL WITTGENSTEIN SYMPOSIUM) 128-31 (Holder-Pichler-Tempsky
eds., 1988). Dr. Barash points to the incoherence of our penal theory, drawing, as
it does, a dichotomy between mental condition as a mitigating (resulting in less
punishment) and as an excusing (wholly exculpating) condition. Id. I would go
further and set both aside as we merely look at the offender's "condition" wheresoever it lies on the mental health continuum and then fashion a remedy.
74. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53, 65 (Cal. 1949) (en banc) (stating
that where insanity is pleaded as defense to criminal charge, trial is broken up into
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solely on whether the Government has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant performed the crime for which he has
been charged. 75 Mental capacity would not be an issue during this
initial phase of the trial. 76 Rather, in this portion of the trial, the
finder or finders of fact are to "look at the defendant's actions and
rely on their own perceptions, experiences, and common sense to
determine whether the defendant formed the specific intent neces77
sary for the crime."
If the prosecution is able to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant performed the act, the case would proceed to the second phase, devoted entirely to considering not only
the defendant's mental capacity, but the full ecology of the crime
and the criminal, with a view toward finding the reasons why the
offender performed the prohibited act, and toward determining an
appropriate remedy for him. 78 Under my proposed revisions, linetwo sections or stages, but in eyes of law there is still only one trial); People v.
Villarreal, 213 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (Ct. App. 1985) (outlining procedure for employing bifurcation); Lucas v. United States, 497 A.2d 1070, 1072 (D.C. 1985) (explaining bifurcation process); Novosel v. Helgemore, 384 A.2d 124, 129 (N.H.
1978) ("In the normal course, . . . the not guilty plea coupled with an insanity
defense should be bifurcated upon request of the defendant."); State v. Brink, 500
N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing system of bifurcation required in accordance with Minnesota Rules Criminal Procedure 20.02 whenever
defendant pleads "not guilty" and also raises defense of insanity).
75. State v. Burnham, 406 A.2d 889, 894 (Me. 1979); Brink, 500 N.W.2d at
802.
76. Villarreal, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 181 ("Since legal insanity is presumed at the
first phase of the trial, evidence to show the existence of legal insanity is barred on
that issue at that stage."); Burnham, 406 A.2d at 894 (noting that defendant may
elect bifurcated trial in which issue of guilt is tried first and issue of insanity tried
second only if jury should find defendant to be guilty); State v. Provost, 490
N.W.2d 93, 102 (Minn. 1992) (stating that it is duty of factfinder, not expert psychiatrist as "thirteenth juror," to examine what defendant said and did to determine whether defendant had requisite criminal intent); State v. Bouwman, 328
N.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Minn. 1982) (holding that expert psychiatric opinion testimony was not admissible in guilt stage of bifurcated trial to show that mentally ill
defendant lacked capacity to form specific intent to kill); Brink, 500 N.W.2d at 803
("At this stage, the defendant has the right to introduce all competent, relevant
evidence disputing the facts upon which the inference of the fact of intent is
sought to be established by the prosecution.... As a general rule [evidence in the
form of expert psychiatric testimony] is not admissible in [the 'guilt phase'].")
(citation omitted); Novosel, 384 A.2d at 129 ("The bifurcation results 'in the complete legal separation of "guilt" from "sanity" because the factfinder in the guilt
phase is not allowed to hear any evidence of mental disease or defect until guilt
has been determined."') (quoting Comment, Mens Rea and Insanity, 28 ME. L. REv.
500, 500 (1977)).
77. Brink, 500 N.W.2d at 803.
78. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 40 (West 1996); Lucas, 497 A.2d at 1072 ("If the jury reaches a not guilty verdict
[in the first phase of the trial], the insanity defense becomes moot. If, however,
the jury returns a guilty verdict, the trial proceeds to the insanity phase."); Brink,
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drawing to determine responsibility need not preoccupy us. In the
second phase of the trial, the finder(s) of fact must determine the
full extent of the defendant's mental capacity, not just the capacity
to form the intent to commit the crime with which he has been
charged. 79 This second phase would also enable the court to make
other findings germane to the remedy, such as the extent or degree to
which mental derangements or infirmities, and all motivators and
actuators, may have contributed to the crime. In this phase of the
trial, all reasons for the crime and all deficiencies of the offender
would be explored to determine a corrective response to his act. In
addition, the court would not concern itself with requiring the social or physical scientist's analysis to fit into the legal system's definition of "insanity" or "mental disease of defect," or other similarly
nebulous and often psychologically meaningless terms. Arbitrary
sanity/insanity lines would be rejected and each offender would be
described in terms of who he is, morally, mentally, emotionally and
genetically; what shall be required of him before he is released; and
what the health, mental health, correction or penal systems must
contribute to support the process. The court, at this phase, would
admit whatever expert and lay testimony "is competent and relevant
to show the defendant's cognition, volition, and capacity to control
his or her behavior," 80 and not be limited simply to a binary yes/no
finding about sanity as an exculpating condition, the goal being to
devise a humanitarian response to one who has committed an antisocial or criminal act, and who is a danger to society if left untreated or untended. I suggest that although we must say to the
offender, "You are all screwed up and must change," we must add,
"And we are here to help you."
I do not diminish the need to show an accused's basal capacity
to form intent. I do, however, suggest that presently the tests for
intent are unscientific and unrealistic. I also suggest that given the
myriad of actuators that come into play in human behavior, this
phase should be expanded to become the basis for remedial decisions for all who transgress the law. One who lacks the requisite
mental capacity, whether due to mental impairment or some kind
500 N.W.2d at 803 ("The second part of an insanity trial is devoted solely to a
consideration of whether the defendant has proved the statutory defense of
mental illness ..
"); State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709, 717 (Minn. 1982) ("The
accused's mental capacity to formulate the requisite intent presents an opportunity
for the presentation of relevant medical testimony, but the ultimate issue involves
his criminal responsibility.").
79. Brink, 500 N.W.2d at 803.

80. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 951

of brain disfunction, may not be found "guilty" in the contemporary sense but may, nonetheless, require some form of commitment
to protect society from further predatory acts. Alternatively, one
who has full capacity and brain function may require full and longterm commitment in prison. Nevertheless, between the polar extremes on the continuum, lie the remainder of the 500,000 persons
whom we incarcerate every year. To arrive at an informed sentencing action, I suggest that remedial goals be established for them as
well, consistent, of course, with their mental condition and all other
factors influencing behavior.
The basic concept of bifurcated trials has received some support at the state level.8 Several states have codified split criminal
trial procedures into their statutory scheme, whereby the defendant
82
who pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity" is tried in two phases.
81. The bifurcated trial has been recognized as appropriate in numerous jurisdictions for long periods of time. State v. Devine, 372 N.W.2d 132, 136 (S.D.
1985). In Wisconsin, bifurcated proceedings were first provided for by statute in
the nineteenth century, and in Bennett v. State, 14 N.W. 912 (Wis. 1883), such statute was found to comport with the state constitution. Id. at 916 ("[T]here is no
constitutional objection to the statute which requires the accused to plead insanity
at the time of the commission of the offense charged, as a separate defense to the
information, together with the plea of not guilty."). In California, Penal Code
§ 1026 has been in existence, in one form or another, since 1927, and was upheld
as constitutional in People v. Troche, 273 P. 767, 770-72 (Cal. 1928). In some states,
the bifurcated trial may be conducted as a matter of course pursuant to statute
when the defendant pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity." People v. Phillips,
153 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Spurgin, 358 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.
1984); Commonwealth v. DiValerio, 423 A.2d 1273, 1276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
Other states have discussed the appropriateness of bifurcation in the absence of a
statute and have permitted bifurcated trials only when the defendant shows he has
a substantial insanity defense and a substantial defense on the merits of any element of the crime for which he has been charged, and that either defense may be
prejudiced by the other in a unitary trial. E.g., Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 787
(Alaska 1979); Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d 745, 748 (Del. 1974); People v. Alerte, 458
N.E.2d 1106, 1114-15 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); State v. Monk, 305 S.E.2d 755, 760-61
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983). In the District of Columbia, courts have ruled that the decision to bifurcate and the procedure to use in a bifurcated proceeding are solely in
the discretion of the trial judge. Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911,925 (D.C.
1979); Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 39 (D.C. 1977). In Devine, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota determined:
[U]pon request of the defendant for a bifurcated trial based on incriminating statements made during a psychiatric examination in connection
with a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court, in order to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights should generally direct a
bifurcated trial .... When a bifurcated trial is ordered, the court should
also prescribe its procedures.
Devine, 372 N.W.2d at 137.
82. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40; MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-314 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.165 (West
1995); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-305 (Michie 1977); MINN. R. CriM. P. 20.02. In
Colorado, the bifurcated trial procedure was prescribed by statute, and could be
employed for trials concerning offenses committed before July 1, 1995. COLO.
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In these states, courts have discussed the propriety of the bifurcated
trial and have supported it, recognizing its effectiveness in permitting the criminal justice system to deal properly with defendants
who plead mental deficiency.8 3 Courts that have interpreted such
rules and statutes generally have recognized that bifurcation protects the integrity of the criminal defendant's trial, permitting the
court and the jury to better understand and deal with the defendant and his behavior-namely, did the defendant commit the
crime, and if so, why? "The bifurcation procedure serves to mitigate two types of prejudice that might occur in a unitary trial: '(1)
prejudice to a defendant's insanity defense arising from the evidence on the merits, and (2) prejudice to a defendant's defense on
84
the merits arising from the insanity evidence."'
Of course, there have been a number of challenges to the constitutionality of statutorily mandated bifurcated trial procedures.
Unless the laws are crafted carefully, new trial procedures established for the separate adjudication of guilt and mental state may
deny the defendant his right to due process. 85 The insanity defense
REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-104 (West 1996). The state legislature, however, added new
provisions to the Colorado Revised Statutes in 1996 to create a unitary process for
hearing issues raised by the affirmative defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
in cases involving offenses committed on or afterJuly 1, 1995. Id. §§ 16-8-101.3, 168-104.5.
In Wyoming, the state supreme court found its statute, which required a bifurcated proceeding where the defendant pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity," to
be an unconstitutional violation of due process of law. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d
270, 278 (Wyo. 1977).
83. E.g., Lucas, 497 A.2d at 1072-73 (noting that bifurcation mitigates prejudice to defendants); Price v. State, 570 A.2d 887, 892 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(noting that bifurcation simplifies first phase of trial); Novosel, 384 A.2d at 129
(recognizing that bifurcation avoids juror confusion).
84. Lucas, 497 A.2d at 1072-73 (quoting Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d
911,925 (D.C. 1979)); see also United States v. Green, 463 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (upholding trial court's decision to grant bifurcated proceeding in view
of fact that substantial prejudice could result from unitary trial as insanity plea
requires testimony that alleged crime was product of accused's mental illness and
such testimony will typically make jury believe that accused committed crime with
which he has been charged, and as evidence of past anti-social propensities may be
highly prejudicial with respect to other defenses); State v. Khan, 417 A.2d 585, 592
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (stating that bifurcation may be warranted, even
where defendant does not request bifurcated trial as to guilt and insanity, where
necessary to prevent possible miscarriage of justice).
85. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (Ariz. 1970) (holding that to
comply with due process, statute providing for bifurcation would have to be interpreted as allowing admission of all evidence at first phase of trial, including evidence as to mental capacity to commit crime, but that to do so would emasculate
act in such way that it would not be carrying out purpose for which it was intended); State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 792-93 (Fla. 1978) (stating that
M'Naghten rule, applicable in Florida, specifically contemplated lack of essential
element of crime-intent-and that barring defendant from introducing evidence
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is based on the defendant's inability to form the requisite intent for
the crime charged-because intent/mens rea is a component of
most crimes, the argument follows that lack of mens rea precludes
criminal responsibility, and should ordinarily result in an acquittal
86
following the "guilt" phase (first phase) of the trial.
Although some types of bifurcated trial procedures have been
attacked successfully on constitutional grounds in Arizona, Florida
and Wyoming, 87 courts in other parts of the country have dismissed
constitutional challenges, and have found that their bifurcation
procedures comport with traditional notions of fair play. 88 In Wisconsin, for example, courts have held that the state's bifurcation
procedure does not violate the requirements of due process, noting
that a finding of insanity "is not a finding of inability to intend; it is
rather a finding that under the applicable standard or test, the defendant is to be excused from criminal responsibility for his acts." 89
In Steele v. State,90 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin further justified
the propriety of bifurcated trial procedure by ruling that admission
of psychiatric evidence during the guilt phase of the trial would
of lack of intent during first phase of trial creates system contrary to due process);
Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977) (same).
86. Green, 355 So. 2d at 792; Sanchez, 567 P.2d at 278. Opponents of bifurcation state that unless a defendant is permitted to introduce evidence as to his lack
of mens rea in the first phase of the bifurcated trial, he is being denied his due
process rights-the factfinder cannot make a determination of guilt without evidence pertaining to the accused's mental state. Shaw, 471 P.2d at 724; Green, 355
So. 2d at 792-93.
87. For a discussion of those cases in which bifurcation was successfully attacked in Arizona, Florida and Wyoming, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text.
88. E.g., People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53, 68 (Cal. 1949) (en banc) (stating that
California Penal Code § 1026, providing for bifurcation, does not violate defendant's due process rights because "[t]he defendant is still presumed to be innocent
at all stages of the trial of all factual elements of guilt, notwithstanding the conclusive presumption, at the first stage, that he is sane"); People v. Troche, 273 P. 767,
770 (Cal. 1928) ("Due process of law is not limited to the due process of the settled
usages of the past, but may include new methods of procedure unknown to the
common law, provided they are in harmony with the accepted underlying principles of such procedure according to the traditions of the common law."); Lucas,
497 A.2d at 1072-73 (noting that bifurcation actually mitigates prejudice to defendant); Jackson, 404 A.2d at 925 (same); Steele v. State, 294 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Wis. 1980)
(same); State v. Hebard, 184 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1971) (noting that due process
is served by permitting defendant to elect bifurcated trial procedure).
89. Hebard, 184 N.W.2d at 163. It is important to note that in Wisconsin, the
defendant has the choice of being tried under the bifurcated procedure or having
all issues determined in a unitary proceeding. Id. at 160. In Arizona and Wyoming, the statutes discussed in Shaw and Sanchez mandated that a bifurcated trial
be held where the defendant entered a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Shaw, 471 P.2d at 720-21; Sanchez, 567 P.2d at 277.
90. 294 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1980).
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jeopardize safeguards designed to protect the defendant as well as
society. 9 1 California has had a bifurcated system since 1927 and
permits evidence of diminished capacity, going to the issue of in92
tent, during the guilt phase of the trial.
The bifurcation I suggest, however, places greater emphasis
upon mentality and causation. I have suggested that we abandon
our preoccupation with punishment, and direct our attention to
devising pragmatic and humane remedies for all offenders. One
who lacks the requisite mental capacity to "intend," and thus does
not have a "guilty mind," may nonetheless require considerable
help. We err when we myopically look at our system as a screen to
filter out those whom we do not want to, or feel we cannot, punish.93 There are many people passing through the criminal justice

system who just need help, regardless of whether they plead their
mental condition as a defense. The myth that punishment cures
crime frustrates our system at each turn. Next, the almost wholly
arbitrary decision as to who knows "right" from "wrong" and,
hence, the decision whether to label one either mentally ill or criminal results in a gross disparity: one gets treatment in an atmosphere of safety if deemed mentally defective, or punishment in an
institution of danger if adjudged normal. "[A] ny intelligent parent
and anyone else who has had experience in child rearing knows
that behavior problems are not merely a matter of fail[ing] to
'know' [right from] wrong. '94 When we seek professional help to
correct a child, especially one with a serious problem, we would

91. Id. at 13-14. The court in Steele noted that under Wisconsin's bifurcated
procedure, during the guilt phase of the trial, courts would not exclude from admission ordinarily admissible evidence tending to prove the defendant's state of
mind. Id. at 14. What is barred during this phase is expert opinion testimony
tending to prove or disprove the defendant's capacity to form the required criminal intent. Id.
92. People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308, 1314 (Cal. 1978). The court in
Wetmore held that evidence of diminished capacity is admissible during the guilt
phase of the bifurcated trial regardless of whether that evidence would also be
probative of insanity. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Green, acknowledged
that because the doctrine of diminished capacity was not available in Florida, and
could not be used in conjunction with the Florida bifurcation statute, it was further
convinced that the Florida statute violated due process. State ex rel. Boyd v. Green,
355 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 1978).
93. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 477 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "bad governments" wrote their laws in "unknown tongue,"
leaving important task of imposing punishment to unbridled discretion of trial
court).
94. WEIHOFEN, supra note 49, at 26-27.
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never limit the counselor to deciding whether the child knew better. 95 We want answers. We want solutions.
The criminal law corrections mechanism is similar. It is, or at
least should be, all about behavior. Behavioral control requires that
we consider a myriad of actuators and motivators, and be prepared
to respond to them. As Dr. Philip Q. Roche says, "our criminal law
is a child rearing system for grownups."'9 6 It matters little to public
97
safety whether one who committed a crime "knew better.
Rather, it matters that a law has been broken and that we need to
contain an offender until that person has been corrected or treated
so that society may once again become safe from further breaches
of the public order by him. Whether one is a psychopath, sociopath or rational criminal, he should not be on the street until he
has been controlled, cured or otherwise corrected.
Finally, I note that the test for insanity and responsibility is
most often employed, in a most crucial sense, where it is probably
least germane-in trials on a charge of homicide. Here, the procedural interplay is between the accused, who is at risk of losing his
life for taking another's, and the public, whose paranoia over crime
is at the site of its deepest roots, the loss of a victim's life. It is also
here that we intuitively conclude that an offender must be at his
most antisocial and inhuman limits because he actually took another's life. That makes one who would be so callous seemingly the
most fitting for the ultimate act of revenge. This may not be so,
however, because here we also find offenders who are the least stable emotionally, morally and culturally. 98 As Bernard C. Glueck, Jr.
observed years ago in America's most stable decade, the 1950s: "It
is my personal opinion ... that no person in our society is in a
normal state of mind when he commits a murder."9 9
95. Id. at 27 (citing Philip Q. Roche, Criminal Responsibility, in PSYCHIATRY
108 (Paul H. Hoch & Joseph Zubin eds., 1955)).
96. Roche, supra note 95, at 108.

AND

THE LAW

97.

WEIHOFEN,

supra note 49, at 27.

98. There are many killings, however, by those whom we do not consider antisocial, inhuman and callous. We kill each other by the millions in politically justified actions called wars. Manufacturers routinely calculate the potential that their
product's design may cause loss of life-and then manufacture knowing that users
will be killed. Speed limits are set as a result of a compromise between impatience
and safety, and have recently been raised even in the face of statistical evidence
that many more motorists will be killed as a result. Death is very much with us.
99. Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., Changing Concepts in Forensic Psychiatry 45 J. CRiM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 123, 130-31 (1954); see also Blake et al., supra note 67, at 1641-46
(conducting study of murderers and finding brain dysfunction at root of their violent behavior). Blake and her associates examined 31 murderers and found none
of them "normal in all spheres," and in 20 of the 31 they found more than one
neurologic diagnosis. Id. at 1643. Evidence continues to accumulate that neuro-
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Yet, it is only he who has killed whom we in turn would kill for
committing the crime. Is the person who has committed a killing
when mentally out of control, suffering from some brain dysfunction, or experiencing a life crisis, worse than the person who makes
a calculated decision to become a career dope peddler, importer or
manufacturer? Should not the passionate offender be easier to
deal with dispassionately than, for example, a person or corporation who commits mass destruction of life, liberty and property,
coolly, deliberately and to make a profit? And do not these offenders really deserve worse? I answer, "no," "yes," and "yes."
I do not necessarily advocate death as a penalty. I agree with
Beccaria, 100 and do not believe we should lightly destroy that which
we cannot create. 10 1 The death option may be penologically necessary in certain situations, but only as a last resort and when other
efforts at correction fail. 10 2 What I do emphasize here are the unending difficulties we encounter when we fail to take a pragmatic
approach to solving the problem of crime and behavior control.
I suggest that upon close examination we will conclude that an
offense-based penal structure, whose response is wholly punitive, is
philosophically and practically deficient, and we will discover that
we must personalize sentences. To provide essentially the same
remedy to all offenders, regardless of their physical, biological,
logic and psychiatric diseases may be at the root of significant numbers of violent
crimes. See id. at 1641 (discussing literature indicating that violent behavior often
results from malfunctions in brain centers within limbic system and temporal
lobes).
100. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT § 28 (David
Young trans., 1986) (1764).
101. See id. (asking "Is it not absurd, that the laws, which detect and punish
homicide, should, in order to prevent murder, publicly commit murder themselves?"). Beccaria stated that the punishment of death is not authorized by any
right. Id. Rather, "it is ... a war of a whole nation against a citizen, whose destruction they consider as necessary or useful to the general good." Id. Beccaria believed that there could be no necessity for taking one's life, unless the person's
existence posed a threat to the security of the nation. Id. See generally Francis Edward Devine, Cesare Baccaria and the Theoretical Foundation of Modern PenalJurisprudence, 7 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 8, 21 (1981) (tracing Baccaria's influence on
modern penal jurisprudence commonly known as "classical criminology").
102. Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Death as a Punishment, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
825, 828 (1996). There are four justifications for punishment: (1) rehabilitation;
(2) deterrence; (3) containment; and (4) retribution. Id. The death penalty does
not rehabilitate, and its deterrent effect has not been shown. Containment is
problematic because it detains one for acts he has not committed and may never
commit and, even if free of all problems, there are alternative containment methods. Although death is the ultimate form of retribution, it is antithetical to a civilized society. Id. at 828-33. For a further discussion of the justifications given by
penologists and other legal scholars for the imposition of punishment, see supra
notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
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mental or social condition, but who have committed the same
crime, is equivalent to prescribing the same treatment for all ill persons whatever the kind or degree of illness. Offense-based punishment is like placing a bandage on the cancerous lesion while
ignoring the cause of the cancer, or equivalent to putting a balm on
the open sore while ignoring the bacteria causing it. Every offender's sentence must treat him for his mental, personal and social
deficiencies, and not be simply a blanket treatment for one who is
identified by the rule he violated. 10 3 The sentence cannot, however, be personal unless we know all about the offender that the
physical and social sciences can tell us, and unless we are prepared
to engage all contemporary technology to model for him the appropriate remedial goals, means and tests for progress and compliance.
We who would reform must remember, nonetheless, that
although mental or other circumstances may explain crime, they do
not excuse it.104 I believe in full accountability. Each offender
must account for his actions and, to the degree to which he has the
capacity or will, to perform voluntary acts or refrain from them.
This accountability cannot function fully in an all-or-nothing, sane/
insane determination, in which we merely determine whether the
offender is responsible or excusable, and from which we decide
whether we should send the offender to prison or a mental ward.
I believe that the criminal justice system should react to infractions of the law by imposing a treatment, a punishment or a combination of both, that is proportionate to the needs and deficiencies
of the individual being sentenced, while being consistent with the
overall goal of public safety. We must make offenders realize that
they as individuals are morally accountable and, if mentally and
morally capable, hold the keys to their release-by conforming to
the norms and goals of free society. In addition, we must view every
sentence as a death-rebirth experience-i.e., a chance to bury an
10 5
offender's past and create a responsible, productive citizen.
103. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices
and Challengesfor America's Future,71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 845, 847 (1996) (noting
that state and federal governments are passing legislation requiring more
mandatory sentences and inflexible sentencing guidelines for individual crimes).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 1961) (stating that although accused suffers from mental disease, he is still responsible for
criminal act ifjury finds beyond reasonable doubt that when accused acted, disease
had not sufficiently weakened his capacity to conform his conduct to requirements
of law).
105. See Nygaard, supra note 15, at 693 (asserting that we should only release
productive and law-abiding citizens, not merely ex-prisoners or criminals). Moreover, this release must be carefully coordinated and be implemented gradually. Id.
As philosopher of criminal law, Jeremy Bentham, urged:
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Thus, we must call upon expertise from all the sciences in reforming and transforming the behavior of our social deviates.
In an aeroplane or train accident, the cause is normally
sought in the immediate circumstances, rather than in any
underlying physical or psychological abnormality in the
persons concerned; and these circumstances are accord10 6
ingly examined with the utmost thoroughness.
We spend much time on that which may well be spectacular
but whose ramifications and pain touch comparatively few lives, and
yet we expend little effort to discover the causes and cures for
crime, which causes grief for an entire culture. As Wootton
concludes:
The nature of the disease is not understood, and the treatment therefore palliative rather than curative: and the
same could be true of criminality. At the same time a
more sinister interpretation in the case of criminality is
also possible-namely, that the treatment itself aggravates
10 7
the disease.
The conclusion is obvious to me: We must look for causes, explore cures and accept, rather than manipulate, answers to the
question-"what works?" The preliminary decision in sentencing at
present is: Whom should we incarcerate and for how long? As it
now stands, courts for the most part impose determinate sentences
set by a legislature far from the factual scenario of the individual
case, in a procedure that is wholly ignorant of the victim, the ecology of the crime and the person to be sentenced. These legislatively-imposed sentencing schemes cannot productively determine
whether the accused is a danger, or if he is, what is necessary to
neutralize his danger. Nor can these sentencing schemes determine when a particular individual will no longer be a danger and
be capable of once again returning to society. This makes both the
sentence and its duration nearly arbitrary. Determinate sentences,
"A convict after having finished his term of imprisonment, ought not to
be restored to society without precautions and without trial. Suddenly to
transfer him from a state of surveillance and captivity to unlimited freedom, to abandon him to all the temptations of isolation and want, and to
desires pricked on by long privation, is a piece of carelessness and inhumanity which ought at length to attract the attention of legislators."
Id. (quoting COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS: BECCARIA,
BENTHAM, ROMILLY 211 (1923)).
106. Woon-roN, supra note 3, at 22.
107. Id. at 4.
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unless followed by and coupled with an indeterminate, goal-oriented period of corrective effort, bear almost no relationship to
guiding the productive principles of penology.
Our legislatures must begin to realize that to develop a pragmatic sentencing scheme, they cannot simply listen to the passions
of society and react viscerally to them.10 8 The public's anger and
frustration are infirm bases upon which to build a dispassionate,
businesslike system.' 0 9 These emotions, while real and predictable,
are counterproductive, and the laws enacted upon these bases are
becoming far too expensive and, too obviously, are failures. We
must take all we have discovered about human behavior and, as in
science, carry our discoveries out to the next decimal, and the next.
We must begin anew to amass empirical data on crimes and offenders with a view toward developing new sentencing formulas,
modeled upon all the data we accumulate, while keeping a watchful
eye on the goal-a safe and productive citizenry.
The simple get mad. The average get even. But the wise come
out ahead. I suggest we start behaving like the last group. I am
certain we will find that no one formula will solve all of the
problems that cause crime. By progressing scientifically in our experiments, by sharing data, and by honestly accepting answers, however, I believe we can begin to renew our correctional system to
respond to the deficiencies of the offender, whatever his crime,
with a remedy that is designed to assure public safety. I suggest that

108. See, e.g., Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a PrincipledDistinction
in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1711, 1713-15 (1996)
(discussing various legislation requiring offender registration, community notification or DNA collection and registration, such as N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 2C:7-6 to -11
(West 1995), known as "Megan's Law," which was enacted following strong public
outcry resulting from murder of seven year-old by pedophile who had recently
been released from incarceration). The opponents of "Megan's Law," which is
intended to inform residents of the identities of convicted sex offenders living in
their neighborhoods, argue that the law indefinitely strips the sex offender of his
fundamental rights "based solely upon unreliable assessment of the convict's predilection to commit future sex crimes." Id. at 1715.
109. See, e.g., Thomas R. Goots, A Thug in Prison Cannot Shoot Your Sister: Ohio
Appears Ready to Resurrect the Habitual Criminal Statute-Will It Withstand an Eighth
Amendment Challenge?, 28 AKRON L. REv. 253, 253-54 (1995) (noting that killing of
twelve year-old by "career criminal" resulted in large public outcry and led to California's swift implementation of "Three Strikes and You're Out" law). The general
"Three Strikes and You're Out" law puts a three-time felon in prison for life, without a thought for rehabilitation. Id. at 254 n.8. Goots argues that these laws, such
as Ohio's recently proposed habitual criminal statute, will protect society by keeping the habitual criminal off the street. Id. at 289.
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this requires us to abandon the simple "responsibility/nonresponsibility" dichotomies and instead, to provide a wide range of options
for individualized sentences, responding to the remedial needs of
offenders, wherever they lie on the continuum between Zilboorg's
"drooling idiot" and the compassionless, calculating criminal.
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